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Abstract
William DORSEY PIESCHEL: The comparison of Peaceful and Violent
Separatist Movements
(Under the direction of Professor Timothy Nordstrom)

The following work is an attempt to understand why separatist movements
become violent. In any given region of the world under any given state, there will
always be a group of people who are not content with the present order of
government. If this group is large enough, it will most likely try to alter the structure
of the government, which often takes the form of separatism. I want to understand
the methods of these separatist movements and specifically, why some resort to
violence and others do not.
The first part of my thesis analyzes different separatist movements. I chose
four to study: Quebec, Scotland, Eritrea, and Chechnya. These four examples vary
widely in terms of geographic region, political culture, economic development,
population, etc, etc. However, the cases of Quebec and Scotland were sufficient
examples of peaceful separatist movements while Eritrea and Chechnya contrast for
their violence. The last chapter is an attempt to understand how separatist movements
develop and most importantly, why they become violent.
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Introduction
Separatist movements have existed for nearly as long as nation-states. The
French Revolution challenged the previously held theories of state-rule, such as
divine right. Instead, self-determination began to gain popularity.* The urge for
national autonomy increased dramatically again after the 1919 Treaty of Versailles
and then again at the end of the cold war. However, separatist movements range from
the relatively peaceful such as those in Scotland and Quebec to the much more violent
movements in Chechnya and Eritrea. In this thesis, I analyze different separatist
movements in order to determine what causes the movement to become more violent
or more willing to compromise with the central government.
I define separatism as any genered movement attempting to gain more
autonomy for a group. This autonomy can range from anything to a regional
government having more control over education to an outright secessionist movement
for independence. However, the international legal basis on when more autonomy is
justified is unclear. Basically, the case rests on three major principles: minority
rights, indigenous rights, and the right to self-determination.^ These rights are very

'Hechter, Michael. Containing Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 113.
^ Ghai, Yash. “Ethnicity and Autonomy: A Framework for Analysis,” in Yash Ghai (ed.) Autonomy
and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-ethnic States(Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), 3.
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difficult to define in reality and legislation, despite the United Nations Charter
including self-determination as a fundamental human right.^
Inextricably tied into claims for separatism and autonomy is nationalism. Not
only is the nationalism of the region that is pushing for autonomy relevant, but also
the nationalism of whatever country the region wants to separate from. Nationality is
also hard to define specifically because of the ebb and flow of ethnicity, which is
„4

“explicable on a variety of social and economic factors,

For example, religion is

losing salience in some places while gedning it in others in terms of defining ethnicity.
One catalyst for ethnic consciousness that occurs often is “oppression by the state or
„5

the majority community.

Stalin was infamous for using this method when he was

trying to create a common Soviet nationality.
According to economist Milica Z. Bookman,fragmentation and secession are
always poor ideas. Not only does the separating region lose the advantages of being
in Isirger heterogeneous communities such as economies of scale and extended
markets, but numerous financial details must be worked out as well. Some of the
difficulties in secession include readjusting tax payments, working out national and
foreign debts, possibly relinquishing subsidies, and so on. However, many separatist
movements are not satisfied with anything less than full independence. This shows
that separatist movements are not necessarily rational entities that are concerned with
the economic bottom line. Rather, each movement has its own particular grievances
with the central state, and then the movement decides with the state if it can work out
its differences peacefully or not.

^ Hechter, Containing Nationalism, 113.
^ Ghai, “Ethnicity and Autonomy: A Framework for Analysis,” 4.
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First, I will analyze the current secessionist movement in Chechnya to
examine the societal and political situations that can lead to violence. Chechnya has a
history of brutal repression by Russia, but the secessionist movement was not
completely polarized until after the fall of the U.S.S.R. However, it does not easily
fall into the category of post-Cold War breakups, as Chechnya has been a part of
Russia since the 19^^ century, well before the inception of the U.S.S.R. In spite of this
long political relationship, a secessionist war broke out in 1994 in which between
50,000- 100,000 Russians and Chechens were killed. Some point to the economics
of oil leading to the bloodshed, while others think individuals are to blame, namely
Yeltsin and Dudaev. There is also a high level of Islanndc radicalism in Chechnya,
which was probably catalyzed by the first war, and a large armed contingent wants to
carve out an Islamist state in the region. Whatever the reason, the secessionist
movement is still active and violent as evidenced by the recent take-over of a
Moscow theatre by Chechen rebels during which over 100 were killed.
Eritrea is another example of an extremely violent secessionist movement.
The civil war between Eritrea and Ethiopia lasted for 30 years. As in Chechnya, the
Eritrea-Ethiopian conflict is characterized by an unyielding central Ethiopian state. In
addition, the personality of Haile Selassie, the Ethiopian emperor until 1974, plays a
key role in the initial violence. However the role of intergovernmental organizations
or military aid from both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. might be more to blame for the
prolonged violence. Eritrea was eventually granted its independence, only to find
itself in another war concerning border disputes with Ethiopia a few years later.

^ Ghai, “Ethnicity and Autonomy: A Framework for Analysis,” 4.
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At first glance, Quebec’s separatism appears to have all the makings of an
equally violent movement. The Quebecois speak French, not English, are for the
most part Catholic, not Protestant, and were for many years excluded from a mostly
English-speaking business class. However, with the exception of an isolated act of
terrorism in 1970, the Quebec movement has been very peaceful. The Parti
Quebecois has had as its central tenet the secession of Quebec from Canada since its
beginnings in the 1970s. It forced the first referendum on Quebec independence
when it took power in the province in 1976. Quebec’s secessionism has been very
detrimental to Canada’s central government, which has been forced to make
concessions to all of the provinces, and not just Quebec. In 1995, Canada was
severely threatened when a referenda for Quebec independence failed by less than
1%.
As another example, the secessionist movement in Scotland might be the
quintessential case of cooperation between a very unitary government of the United
Kingdom and a nation clamoring for more autonomy. The Scottish movement also
stands in great contrast to the actions of the Irish Republican Army, which has similar
goals, but very different means. Instead of resorting to violence, Scotland has
successfully used political parties, campaigns, and referenda to obtain its first
Parliament since the abolition of the old one in 1707. Scotland does have many
advantages over separatist movements in other parts of the world. First of all, less
than 1% of the Scottish population speaks Gaelic, the original language of the Scots.
Also, Scotland doesn’t have a major religious difference with the UK. Most

4

importantly, Scotland does not have the level of abject poverty that breeds fanaticism
and extremism which exists in Chechnya and especially in Eritrea.
These four examples provide cases of the extremes of separatism, both
peaceful and violent. Many governments dealing with separatism are faced with
relatively small numbers of armed contingents using terrorism, while others deal with
more or less violence. However, if what turns a separatist movement violent can be
reduced to a few precipitating causes, both separatist groups and central governments
should be much better able to use this knowledge to avoid casualties and fatalities.

5

David vs. Goliath: The Violence of Chechnya’s Separatism
On October 27, 1991, General Dzhotkhar Dudaev was elected president of
Chechnya in an election that saw a turnout of only 10-12 % of the total population.
Dudaev received the most votes of three candidates, and one of his first acts in power
was the declaration of sovereignty of the Chechen Republic.^ However, The Russian
parliament declared this act illegal on November 2,1991, and Boris Yeltsin
dispatched troops to Chechnya to keep it from separating. The military means for
declaring the state of emergency necessary to use force against Chechnya was still
under control of the Soviet Union and Mikhail Gorbachev. The Gorbachev-Yeltsin
rivalry, which would culminate in the destruction of the Soviet Union, was just

6

beginning to intensify, and this fact might be the main reason that Gorbachev
hesitated to use force/ Regardless, Dudaev and his supporters appeared to have
stood firm against Russia and the Soviet Union, and Yeltsin would lose his best
opportunity to prevent a war during which 50,000-100,000 were killed and the
population of Grozny reduced from 400,000 to 200,000.
Russo-Chechen antagonisms are rooted in the 1830s when the tsar of Russia
was initially trying to conquer the region. Whatever bad feelings Chechens had
towards Russia were greatly exacerbated when Stalin ordered mass deportations of
Chechens from the regions in 1944.^ Under the accusation of conspiring with Nazi
Germany,“about 500,000 people were rounded up, starting in the middle of the night
of February 22-23, 1944, and packed into trains.”^ Many died on the harsh journey
and even more succumbed during the harsh winter at Kazakhstan,leading to about a
quarter of the deported population perishing within five years of their arrival. Thus
the Chechens would be noticeably disturbed with the Russian dominated Soviet
Union. Nonetheless, many Chechens began to make their way back to their U.S.S.R.
dominated region, especially in 1956 when Nikita Khrushchev’s administration
10

allowed the deported groups to return to their homeland.
Furthermore, Chechens were never well assimilated into the Soviet Union.
Again, the deportations undoubtedly had a major role in this lack of assimilation. In
spite of the deportations, the Chechens were able to retain both their own culture and

^ Matthew Evangelista. The Chechen Wars: Will Russia Go the Way ofthe Soviet Union?
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002), 19.
^ Evangelista, The Chechen Wars, 20.
* Victor Kogan lasnyi and Diana Zisserman-Brodsky. “Chechen Separatism,” in Metta Spencer (ed.)
Separatism: Democracy and Disintegration(New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998),
206.
’Evangelista, The Chechen Wars, 14.
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language.

The Soviet Union allowed the development of local institutions that

taught indigenous languages and encouraged native culture. Evangelista describes
12

this system as a “‘hothouse’ of nationalism.’

Thus, in the last census in 1989 before

the collapse of the Soviet Union, Chechnya had a population of 1,084,000, of whom
715,000 were unassimilated Chechens. By 1996, the total population would be
13

reduced to 850,000 from the first war.

Thus, the demographics and historical

relation of Chechnya to Russia make separatism seem very plausible.
Furthermore, the unique style of Soviet federalism created local political
institutions and nominally recognized a large degree of local autonomy, but the
’superimposition of various overlapping administrative structures” took away most of
14

that autonomy.

This situation made it very easy for Dudaev to take control, as he

did not need to create new governmental institutions from nothing, but merely had to
seize the existing ones.
In 1916, V.I. Lenin argued for the self-determination of all peoples, but his
goal was to promote the breakup of empires. After the Revolution failed to spread
world-wide and the Communist state was firmly in place, the long-term goal of Soviet
Communism was changed to not merely bring the “nations together but to bring about
15

their merger.

However, a major problem was that the many nations were being

merged not towards a neutral Soviet nationalism, but rather merged more under a
Russian hegemony. The most conspicuous example of this was illustrated by Stalin’s

10

Evangelista, The Chechen Wars, 14.
lasnyi, “Chechen Separatism,” 213.
12
Evangelista, The Chechen Wars, 3.
13
lasnyi, “Chechen Separatism,” 207.
Richard Sakwa. Soviet Politics in Perspective, 2'“‘ Edition (New York: Oxford University Press,
2002), 238.
Sakwa, Soviet Politics, 238.
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administration in the 1930s, which enforced the anti-Islamic and “Russifying
compulsory Cyrillicization” of Arabic writing.*^ Thus, after the Soviet bureaucracy
was firmly in place, social mobility “was more rapid for those who adopted Soviet
»17

ideology and the Russian language.
The most obvious reason for the outbreak of war in Chechnya can be
attributed to Boris Yeltsin never meeting with Dudaev face to face even once in the
years leading up to the war. Yeltsin could have possibly been attempting to bolster
18

his approval ratings in taking a hard line stance against the Chechens,

This plan

would have involved stirring up patriotism among Russians to make his
administration appear more legitimate.

Another possible cause is that Yeltsin

wasn’t in his right mind during those years. Evangelista gives a couple of examples
of Yeltsin being very drunk at an official state function and one where he missed a
meeting with the Irish prime minister because he was too drunk to function.
To understand why Yeltsin’s, and later Putin’s, ratings were boosted because
of their taking a hard-line stance against Chechnya, one must first understand the
stereotype Chechnya had in the Soviet Union and in Russia in particular. Seely likens
the Chechen stereotype in Russia to that of the Sicilian bandits in southern Italy:
»20

poor, proud, and armed.

Furthermore,“among Russians of all backgrounds and
,21

classes, Chechens are somewhat distrusted, sometimes indeed actively loathed.

In

16

Benedict Anderson. “Imagined Communities” in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds.)
Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 95.
Sakwa, Soviet Politics, 251.
Evangelista,
The Chechen Wars, 4.
19
Hearing on Chechnya: Hearing before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, One
Hundred Fourth Congress, first session. May 1, 1995 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O., 1995), 15.
Robert Seely. Russo-Chechen Conlict, J800-2000: A Deadly Embrace (Portland: Frank Cass
Publishers, 2001), 182.
Seely, Russo-Chechen Conflict, 185.
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general, all Caucasians are distrusted by them, and their darker skin and wider noses
make them phenotypically conspicuous to the Russian type.
Like all stereotypes, this stereotype of Chechens as criminals might be
inaccurate for the majority of Chechens, but Dudaev’s regime in all probability had
many criminal connections. Chechnya was already a hotbed of organized crime
activity in the 1980s. After Dudaev came to power, many of these groups used
Dudaev’s regime to refine oil illegally in Chechnya before exporting it at world, not
Russian, prices.^^ Furthermore, allegedly many Soviet weapons were sold for private
profit through Chechnya to Yemen, Afghanistan, and Bosnia. A common fraud was
to claim that arms from a military base had been stolen, when in reality the
commanding officer would have sold them to the highest bidder. Thus, Dudaev was
not simply a benign leader vying for more autonomy for his oppressed people. His
constant use of mob rhetoric and his coterie of criminals left him with a very negative
public image.
However, his advisors should be held as much at fault as Yeltsin, in assuring
him that a war would be quick and decisive. The Russian military might have been
yearning for its more glorious days of the Soviet Union and therefore its leaders were
over-anxious for war. On the other hand, the Russian military advisors could have
underestimated the strength and motivation of the Chechen fighters, while
overestimating the poorly paid and unenthusiastic Russian troops. Furthermore, the
precedence for violence had already been established in 1993 when Yeltsin dismissed
23

parliament and proceeded to shell them inside the White House.

22
23

Seely, Russo-Chechen Conflict, 189.
“Hearing on Chechnya,” 16.
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As much credit for war should be given to Dudaev as anyone else for the
hard-line, extremist positions that he adopted from the beginning. Because he
succeeded in driving out the Russian army and seizing their weapons,full-scale war
became almost inevitable. By either buying the arms from unconcerned Soviet
soldiers or outright seizure of them, Dudaev amassed an arsenal of “40,000 automatic
weapons and machine guns, 153 cannons and mortars,42 tanks, 18 Grade multiple
rocket launchers, 55 armored personnel carriers, several training aircraft and
»24

helicopters, and 130,000 grenades,

One would not think that Dudaev would need

this type of arsenal if he were going to settle the matter of Chechen independence
diplomatically. However, Dudaev might have also realized that the only way the
Russian administration would take him seriously would be if he had a formidable
military threat.
Dudaev made a serious error when he overestimated the economic and
strategic benefits of an independent Chechnya. Chechnya is a landlocked region, but
it does have oil, which “has been the most important factor in the region’s economy
for a long time.

.25

But it is not the actual oil reserves that are important, but rather
26

Chechnya’s significance as an oil refiner.

Thus, much of Chechnya’s economic

advantages came from its being a part of the Soviet Union’s and later Russia’s larger
economy.. Therefore its economic importance was greatly diminished after its
separation from Russia. This is evidenced by Russia’s ability to build a new pipeline
„27

in 1997 that cut “Chechnya completely out of Russia’s Caspian oil affairs.

24

Evangelista, The Chechen Wars, 21.
lasnyi, “Chechen Separatism,” 207.
26
Seely, Russo-Chechen Conflict, 197.
27
Evangelista, The Chechen Wars, 53.
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Thus, the causes for the first Chechen war can be attributed to Yeltsin and
Dudaev decisions, as much as anything. If Russia had a more democratic
government, Yeltsin’s aggression might have been prevented. Then again, if Dudaev
had not been so rash in declaring Chechen independence, Yeltsin and his
administration might have been much more willing to discuss the situation instead of
opting for the use of force. However, the Chechen government did seem to have as
legitimate a cause as did the other republics in the former Soviet Union who declared
independence. Whatever reason was most to blame for the onset of the first war, one
would think that the atrocities resulting from that war would be enough to prevent a
second. However, Vladimir Putin would send in troops to Chechnya again in 1999.
Chechen retained de facto independence when Russia pulled its troops out of
Chechnya in 1996, but it also gained a much bigger problem: religious extremism.
This extremism would take the form of radical Islam, and some of the radical leaders
would come to dream of an Islamic state encompassing Chechnya and Dagestan,
28

which had access to the Caspian Sea.

After Russian forces killed Dudaev, Aslan

Maskhadov was elected president of the very weak Chechen government.
Maskhadov envisioned “a nominally independent Chechnya working in close
economic and political cooperation with Russia,” but Yeltsin reneged on almost all of
29

the fifty provisions that Russia agreed to after the peace agreements in 1996.

Thus,

with the Chechen economy in shambles and radical Islam increasing, Maskhadov was
forced into the transition to Shariah law in February of 1999.

29

Evangelista, The Chechen Wars, 50.
Evangelista, The Chechen Wars, 51.
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The precipitating cause for Putin’s invasion of Chechnya in 1999 was the
invasion of Dagestan by Chechen rebels with the intent of establishing an Islamist
state. Citing the need to quash terrorism, Putin no longer recognizes Maskhadov as
president and begins the second invasion of Chechnya. Again, Russian nationalism is
stirred up as terrorist attacks in Moscow give Putin greater public support for this
war.
There are many viable precipitating causes that could have begun either or
both Chechen wars. However, what is of special significance is that the Russian
public supported both Yeltsin and Putin in their wars against Chechnya. This distinct
Russian distaste for Chechnya might also partly explain why such force was used
only against Chechnya and not Tatarstan, which was in a similar predicament. For
whatever reason, Chechnya is still not independent from Russia; however, on March
23, 2003, Chechens supposedly approved a new draft constitution from Moscow, with
96% of voters supporting it. Putin claims that “the last serious problem in relation to
Russia’s territorial integrity has been solved,” even though the referendum took place
30

while the war that started in 1999 is still continuing.

30

BBCnews World Edition online. “Chechnya ‘backs new Constitution’” Monday,24 March, 2003.
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/2/hi/europe/2879383.stm.
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Eritrea: The Role of Outside Influences in an Armed Separatist Conflict
The Eritrean secessionist war stemmed directly from colonialist tendencies.
However, the colonialism was not that of a European power extending hegemony
over an African nation, but that of an African nation extending over a territory. The
ancient kingdom of Abyssinia expanded three fold in the late 19* and early 20*
centuries in what is now Ethiopia. Haile Selassie, who became emperor in 1930,
continued to extend Ethiopian rule, as well as to modernize Ethiopia. His progressive
government and expanding bureaucracy “forced the many regional races to either
»,31

oppose him treasonably or join him with their support,

Eritrea was, in this respect.

very similar to many other regions that had been subjected to Ethiopian rule, but it did
not join Selassie with support. Eritrea consists of nine distinct ethnic groups, and its

14

nationality comes from “an entity constructed from the encounters with Italian
„32

colonialism, Ethiopian hegemony, and the post-1945 international state system.
Ethiopia was only under European control from 1937 to 1941 during the time
in which Mussolini was attempting to establish his fascist empire in Africa. During
Italian colonialist expansion, not only was Eritrea supposed to become the industrial
backbone of Mussolini’s East-African empire, but “Italian rule [also] brought all of
the inhabitants of Eritrea under the rule of a single power for the first time in the
„33

territory’s history.

Upon Mussolini’s defeat in Africa and Selassie’s return from

exile in Britain, Ethiopia continued to expand its empire. Selassie was able to do this
by the use of international statesmanship via the United Nations as both Britain and
the United States supported a federalist government that included both Ethiopia and
Eritrea.
Because Eritrea consisted of basically a territory with no dominant majority
nation of peoples to coincide with that territory, Ethiopia first became joined to
Eritrea in a federalist system by a United Nations backed charter on December 2
1950, after being a protectorate of Britain in the post-War years. More specifically,
“the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 390 A(V)to federate Eritrea with
,»34

Ethiopia as ‘an autonomous unit...under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown.
This federal system that Britain devised with the U.N. was the first evidence of
Ethiopia's extending its power over Eritrea. The “sovereignty of the Ethiopian

Cutri, Mike. Haile Selassie, http://history.acusd.edu/gen/text/selassie.html.
lyob, Ruth. The Eritrean Strugglefor Independence: Domination, Resistance, Nationalism, 19411993(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995), 3.
33
Pateman, Roy. Eritrea: Even the Stones are Burning (Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press, Inc.,
1998), 41.
34
lyob. The Eritrean Strugglefor Independence, 82.

32
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Crown part” caused chafing for Eritreans under the Ethiopian empire on two different
levels. This was not only the continuation of an imperial patronage of Eritrean
leaders who enacted policies beneficial to the empire, but also the “manipulation of
the legal provisions which guaranteed the autonomy of the Eritrean government over
,35

its internal economic, social, and political affairs.
On some level, the Ethiopian government can be described as simply trying to
extend the state throughout Eritrea, but actual Eritrean involvement in the expanding
state and bureaucracy was limited. In this manner, Selassie was able to chip away at
Eritrean sovereignty over until 1962, when it was officially annexed. Before this act,
the Eritrean Liberation Force commenced its armed struggle on September 1,1961.
Official Ethiopian action against the ELF began in December, 1962.^^ This struggle
would last for thirty years and decimate the economies and societies of both regions.
Ethiopia would not have been able to carry out such a prolonged armed
struggle without the sustained help of outside providers. This help came with not
only the lack of action from the U.N., who considered the matter to be internal even
after it had created the country only a few years earlier, but also with help from both
the United States and the Soviet Union. One critic believes that it was mainly
through the incapacity of the U.N. that the separatist movement became an armed
struggle.^^ By limiting its role to “damage control” in Africa, the UN has focused
38

more on the impact of conflicts as opposed to the conflicts,

However, there wasn’t

much else that the UN could do, as Eritrea could not be defined as a colony and there

35
36 lyob, The Eritrean Strugglefor Independence, 82.
37

Pateman, Eritrea, 96.

38 lyob, The Eritrean Strugglefor Independence, 33.
lyob, The Eritrean Strugglefor Independence, 31.
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did not exist a “people” of Eritrea. Besides, there was just as good a chance that
whatever regime took control of an independent Eritrea would be just as brutal, nondemocratic, and repressive as that feared in Ethiopia.
Furthermore, Selassie and his efforts at keeping Eritrea were supported by the
Organization for Africa Unity after its conception in 1963. A good idea in theory, the
OAU was designed to be an inter-governmental entity conceived for the prevention of
wai- and strife, with a purpose very similar to the UN’s. Unfortunately for the
Eritreans and many other minorities, the OAU was staunchly opposed to acquiescing
to any separatist movement. One of the main reasons for this firm stand is that “the
heads of state who attend the OAU summits are, in the main, military dictators, or
men who have a tenuous power base, dependent upon the support of ethnic
,39

minorities.’

Ethiopia was also very adept at negotiating assistance from both the U.S. and
the Soviet Union during the cold war. The U.S. supported Selassie’s regime until its
overthrow in 1974 by the military, which proclaimed itself Marxist. Between 19521975, “United States military assistance to Ethiopia was worth some $275 million.”
This assistance involved everything from a squadron of F-5 fighter jets in 1964 to M40

60 tanks in the mid 1970s.

Ethiopia was even able to receive aid from both the

United States and the Soviet Union for a period immediately after the Dergue, the
military regime, took control. The first shipment of Soviet tanks arrived in 1977;
41

however, the U.S. donated $109.4 million during the same year.

39
40

Pateman, Eritrea, 4.
Pateman, Eritrea, 128.
Pateman, Eritrea, 128.
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Ethiopia initially received a significant amount of support from Israel after
convincing the Israeli government that the separatist movement was Arab in nature.
This position was based on a belief that Eritrea’s population had a Muslim majority;
however, there had never been a comprehensive census to support this belief. Also,
in 1954, before the hostilities had escalated to armed conflict, Ethiopia had signed a
42

secret security pact with Israel,

Israel was then instrumental to the Ethiopian

government in training soldiers and police officers in counter-insurgency action.
The ELF did come to rely on Middle Eastern powers for training and arms.
However, this fact can be attributed to Ethiopia’s global propaganda campaign
against Eritrea. Since the beginning of the Eritrean independence movement,“the
Eritrean liberation fighters have been variously characterized as bandits, extremists,
„43

Muslim separatists, Marxists, ultra-leftists and a host of other epithets,

The ELF

can be criticized for resorting to violence, but it was left with almost no choice as
Ethiopia removed any political means of reconciliation. Also, the Eritreans became
understandably embittered as Ethiopian Amhara Christians were occupying an
unproportionally large share of the most profitable government and bureaucratic
positions in Eritrea.
Ethiopia could have not possibly carried out an armed struggle against the
Eritreans on such a scale for thirty years without substantial outside aid. However,
the countries that aided in the form of arms only contributed to the strife. The
Eritrean liberation army might have only started as small contingents using guerilla
warfare tactics, but with captured Ethiopian arms, Eritrea soon had a formidable

42
43

Pateman, Eritrea, 95.
Pateman, Eritrea, 93.
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army. Furthermore, the outside influences make future skirmishes and armed conflict
even more likely by continuing to send aid in the form of arms. In 1998, only five
years after Eritrea gained its independence with a referendum, war broke out again
over sparsely populated land during which both sides lost thousands of soldiers. This
war ended in June 2000, but a violent precedent has already been created.
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Quebec: Secession for the Protection of Culture
I was discussing the issue of Quebec’s relative autonomy with a history
professor, when he told me an anecdote of a man who moved to Montreal to mn a
hardware store. The man spoke English, but he was later forced to change the sign
for his business to French, despite having managed the store there for years. Under
the constraint of new law, he thus changes the name of his store from “Lou’s
Hardware” to “Lou’s materiels.” Lou was then fined for his incorrect use of French
grammar. This illustration shows to what extent the French-speaking Quebec
nationalists have come to control their own region in mostly English speaking
Canada. However, this control of francophone Quebecois over their government has
come with almost no bloodshed. There have been no armed contingents seizing
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governments, little terrorism, and no overzealous government crackdowns. Over the
past 50 years, Quebec has gained so much sovereignty that the very existence of the
federal Canadian government has been threatened, and a referendum for Quebec
sovereignty in 1995 lost by less than 1%.
The French colony of New France came under conquest of the British in 1759,
with “the military defeat of Montcalm’s forces by Wolfe’s English troops on the
,44

Plains of Abraham above Quebec City.

In 1837-8, a violent uprising occurred in

Montreal and in what was then Upper and Lower Canada, with the goal of forming a
republic. The British were able to quell this uprising, and in 1867, Canada became a
highly centralized federation when the British North America Act united Ontario,
45

Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick in the Dominion of Canada.

The early 1960s was a very important period in the evolution of Quebecois
nationalism and is referred to as the Quiet Revolution. During this period, “the state.
traditionally viewed as a second-class institution in a province where most social
services were controlled by the Church and where government was associated with
>546

crass patronage, became the focus of nationalist energies.

Before 1960, the Union

Nationale, which had dominated Quebec politics since the end of World War II,
47

believed that welfare should be a matter for private charity and the Church,

Thus,

during the Quiet Revolution, many social functions previously controlled by the
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Church came to be controlled by the State. Furthermore, many Quebecois gained the
right to opt-out of many national policies during the 1964 Constitutional Amendment
48

talks.

Instead, Quebec would receive fiscal compensation and increased tax points

in exchange.
The first real gains of the Quebec sovereignty movement came in 1963 with
the creation of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. This
commission created a fair amount of controversy, but further autonomy gains were
made in 1969 with the Official languages act. This act enshrined French as the
required language in the public institutions while also calling for the bilingual
labeling on all products sold in Canada."^^ However, these gains were not enough for
many Quebec separatists, so the Parti Quebecois^ which is still officially dedicated to
separatism, was formed in 1970. This year also saw a small amount of bloodshed
when Quebec separatists kidnapped a British trade official and murdered a Quebec
minister. In 1976, the PQ ascended to the provincial level, and in 1980, the first
referendum was held on a form of “sovereignty-association” for Quebec.^^ It reads as
follows:

The Government of Quebec has made public its proposal to negotiate a new
arrangement with the rest of Canada, based on the equality of nations; this
arrangement would enable Quebec to acquire the exclusive power to make its laws,
administer its taxes and establish relations abroad - in other words, sovereignty and at the same time to maintain with Canada an economic association including a
common currency; no change in political status resulting from these negotiations will
48
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be effected without approval by the people through another referendum; on these
terms, do you give the Government of Quebec the mandate to negotiate the proposed
51

agreement between Quebec and Canada? Yes. No.

This is obviously not simple, straight-forward wording asking the voter if he
or she wishes to remain a part of Canada. The wording stresses how Quebec would
remain connected to Canada as much as it would gain in sovereignty. Regardless, the
bill fails by a margin of 59.6% to 40.4%. The 1995 referendum is even more cryptic
and arcane:

Do you agree that Quebec should become sovereign, after having made a formal
offer to Canada for a new Economic and Political Partnership within the scope of the
Bill respecting the future of Quebec and of the agreement signed on 12 June 1995?
Yes. No.52

Again, this wording was in part an attempt by the PQ and other separatists to assail
any fears that soft nationalists might have of independence. They did such a good job
of assailing those fears that “many Yes supporters even believed that after
independence they would continue to elect representatives to the Canadian
„53

Parliament.

It almost seemed as if the PQ and the separatists were attempting to

sneak independence past the citizens of Quebec. This referendum also failed, but
only by 50.6% to 49.4%.
In 1982, Rene Levesque, the premier of Quebec, refused to sign the
Constitution Act of 1982, which granted Canada complete autonomy from Britain.
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This refusal was for the most pai't irrelevant, for Quebec still was legally and
54

technically a province of Canada.

However, this refusal to sign would lead to the

Meech Lake Accord in 1990, which was designed to obtain Quebec’s signature.
Quebec wanted further autonomy from Canada before it would sign. This attempt
would become a fiasco and annoy not only many anglophone Canadians but also
many francophone Quebecois.
The Quebec sovereignty movement is very similar to other sovereignty
movements in western industrial societies, with the exception of its “strength and
persistence.

.55

This strength and persistence is especially puzzling when one

examines the goals of the separatists. It is true that around 6 million of Quebec’s 7
million citizens speak French instead of English, but there is no major economic gap
or widespread animosity between Francophones and Anglophones. Nationalistic
fervor against English business might be a cause, but there is “no evidence remaining
of the historic injustices that drove the nationalist impulse a couple of generations
„56

ago.

Furthermore, small and medium-sized businesses are protected by Quebec,

Inc. The economic argument for secession is basically null and void as “the
proposition that Quebec is a net-loser in federal-provincial transfers is quite flatly
„57

untrue, even if widely believed by credulous Quebec voters.
Thus, instead of the typical secessionist arguments of economic inequalities or
government abuse, most of the secessionists in Quebec have a very neo-liberal
argument for secession, which Whitaker refers to as a sovereignty about “the
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»58

symbolism of recognition.

Thus,for the referendum in 1995, pro-secessionists

focused on what would remain the same after secession, for example, Quebec’s
inclusion in NAFTA. Quebec would even keep the Canadian dollar as its official
currency. Another key argument for secessionists involves the decline of nation
states with globalization.^^ If the nation-state is becoming less and less important
with intergovernmental organization, why doesn’t Quebec go ahead and start its own
country?
The reason the Quebec secessionist movement has remained relatively non¬
violent thus far could possibly be because very little would change in the day-to-day
lives of Quebecois if they had an independent country. Even when Lucien Bouchard
stirs voters with “nationalist eloquence into an emotional response”, the average
rational citizen is still not likely to grab a weapon and risk his or her life for merely a
different flag.^° However, what is important for many separatists is not the day to day
issues, but the survival of French-Canadian culture, the “distinct society” over
generations.
Quebec is unique in the western hemisphere in that it was able to develop and
61

sustain its own culture and did not assimilate into English, Spanish, or Portuguese.
However, without sufficient protection for the enclave of6 million francophone

Quebecois in the middle of 300 million allophones, French Canadian culture would
disappear after a few generations. This is because as the population of francophones
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decreases, the “cultural industries” of the language, e.g. newspapers, films, television.
62

would gradually disappear.

A comparable situation is the gradual disappearance of

Yiddish, despite the presence of 2.5 million of Jews in and around New York. Thus,
as “people generally think about their own language, like their health, only when it is
threatened,” an outsider might easily underestimate the volition and determination of
63

people with a threatened language.
One of the first pieces of legislation that the Parti Quebecois enacted upon
assuming provincial power was the Charter of the French Language in 1977,
64

commonly referred to as Bill 101.

After the passage of this bill, the Quebec

government began promoting French as a common language. This goal of French as
a common language is incompatible with the bilingualism of French and English, as
evidenced by the enforcement of all commercial signs having to be in French.
Furthermore, the bill required that all immigrants coming to Quebec must send their
children to French-language schools, in order to ensure the renewal and continuation
65

of the language in the region.

Thus, it is the survival of the distinct society, which was defined in the
Charlottetown accord as “a French-speaking majority, a unique culture, and a civil
law tradition” which drives the support for Quebec sovereignty, not economic
inequalities or government repression. But, is the threat of cultural extinction enough
to drive a society to violence? There has been almost no bloodshed in this separatist
movement; however, the failure of the Meech Lake Accord in 1991 for Quebec to
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come to an agreement with the rest of the provinces hardened the positions of both
French and English speaking Canadians. Richards draws a parallel between the
failure of the Meech Lake Accord to the defeat of Gladstone’s Irish Home Rule Bill
66

in the United Kingdom in 1886.

Even though the Irish Home Rule Bill was

designed to make concessions to Ireland so that separation from Great Britain was not
necessary, the failure of the bill caused both sides to hardened their stances. As
compromise became less and less plausible, widespread violence broke out and lasted
for many years before Ireland was officially granted sovereignty.
The federal Canadian government is in a very awkward position with respect
to Quebec. Even though the 1995 referendum on sovereignty failed, an estimated
60% of francophones still support separatism. Further complicating matters is the
conflict that the Bill 101 creates with the Canadian Charter of Rights, which
guarantees “freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression.” The Canadian
Supreme Court decided that Bill 101 violated the charter in 1988, and commercial
67

signs can now include English,

Furthermore, even though there has been relatively

little violence, precedence for violence has already been set with the kidnapping of a
British trade official and the murder of a Quebec minister. Thus, widespread violence
for secession might seem improbable, but the possibility always exists.

66
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Scotland: Devolution from a Unitary State
On July 24*, 1997, plans for a new Scottish Parliament to be held in
Edinburgh starting in 1999 were published. This devolution of power created a
Scottish Parliament that would be the first real evidence of Scottish home rule since
the old Scottish Parliament voted for its own abolition in 1707. Furthermore, this
devolution was also obtained without a drop of blood being spilt.
Scotland was officially adopted into Great Britain with the Act of Union of
1707. This wasn’t all that abrupt of a change, because the two kingdoms had been
under the same monarch, the Stuarts, for most of the previous century. Some Scots
viewed this union with dismay, possibly as an expansion by England, as the Scottish
parliament in Edinburgh voted itself out of existence. However, the union did give
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the Scots a very important economic concession: “free trade with England and
,.68

throughout the empire.

Union with England also assimilated Scotland further into

a common “Britishness,” so that today, less than 1% of the Scottish population speaks
Gaelic, the original language of the Scots.
There were four main routes to the Scottish parliament:(1)the creation of
Home Rule Pressure Groups(2)the establishment of constitutional conventions(3)
the use of petitions and referenda(4)the creation of a political party to campaign for
constitutional change.^^ Scotland already had a large measure of independence from
England as it was able to retain key aspects of is civil society, e.g. its church and the
educational system, after the Act of Union. Thus, the independence movement was
more for political Home Rule, than for any other separatist cause.
The movement was also in part fueled by nationalistic fervor that would make
the Parliament a Parliament of the Scots, and not just one of mere regionalism. In
comparison to other European Union countries, the government of the United
Kingdom gained its unitary control much later. The German Lander have a very
large amount of power in comparison to the federal government; Italy began the push
for regionalism in the 1960s, and France even has a substantial amount of power
controlled by its regions and departments. However, these examples show
governments giving power back to regions and not to nations, as is the case with
Scotland.
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The movement for Scottish independence existed for over a century before the
parliament was actually established. The first real evidence of a separatist movement
was evidenced by the creation of the Scottish National Party in 1934, whose goal was
full independence. The party developed from the Scottish Home Rule Association,
but it did not have a large, cross-class support base. The SHRA had organized the
first Scottish National Conventions during this time as well. Because of the lack of
widespread support, the first referendum was not held until 1979, and it merely
included the question of whether Scotland should have its own parliament. 51.6 per
70

cent of a voter turnout of 63.6 percent voted Yes.

However, a stipulation that

required 40 per cent of the electorate, not the voters, caused the referendum to fail.
In 1989, the Scottish Constitutional Convention set out with the purpose of
71

creating a solid proposal for devolution,

It was also an attempt to iron out

differences before the next referendum in 1997. The 1979 referendum was marked
by deep inter-party divisions, which can be partly blamed for the failure of the
referendum. This third Scottish Constitutional Convention also attempted to generate
cross-class support for devolution. The Scottish Constitutional Convention’s final
document proposed a “129-member Parliament, with seventy-three constituency and
fifty-six list members, as well as proposals for tax powers, devolved responsibilities,
relations with local government, and public participation in the Parliament’s
„72

activities.
1

The 1997 referendum on the creation of a Scottish Parliament passed with
74.3 percent of a voter turnout of 60.2 percent. Prime Minister Tony Blair of the
70

Lynch, Scottish Government and Politics, 10.
Lynch, Scottish Government and Politics, 11.
f

30

British Labour Party did not require the referendum to have a 40 percent approval
rating of the electorate, thus the referendum had a much better chance of passing. A
second question on the referendum involved the powers of taxation, which also
passed with 64.3 percent of voters supporting them. However, the Scottish
Parliament effectively has no fiscal autonomy, as it operates through a block grant
from Westminster. This leaves the Scottish Parliament with a limited source of
revenue even when compared to other regional governments: “Canadian provinces
have provincial sales taxes, Spanish income tax in the 1990s,[and] the three Belgian
„73

regions also receive a share of locally-raised income tax.
Despite the work by independence movement supporters, the new powers of
parliament would eventually include the control of rather mundane powers, such as
the train schedule and environmental policies. Policies concerning “control of the
constitution, defense, foreign affairs, social security, taxation, company regulation.
74

and management of the economy” would still be controlled through Westminster.
The Parliament would have only a 3p margin of adjustment for taxation, so nearly all
of its funds would come through a block grant from Westminster. With these sorts of
stipulations, the parliament seems like a very small gain for the overall independence
movement. However,one major cheiracteristic of the Scottish Constitution is that the
Scottish Parliament is only told what it cannot do. This fact was accomplished by
reserving the specific powers of the United Kingdom to Westminster. Therefore,
control of future policies goes to Edinburgh, not Westminster. Thus, one critic
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believes that devolution has “placed Scotland on a motorway without exits leading to
»75

independence.
One of the reasons that the Scottish independence movement intensified was
because the Parlieiment in Westminster was ruled by members of the Conservative
Party and Margaret Thatcher, even though this was the minority party in Scotland.
This same problematic situation was occurring in Wales as well. The unitary nature
of the British state created further friction. Thus, devolution did not only go to

\
T

r

Scotland. However, Scotland did receive more autonomy than Wales, which only
was granted a National Assembly and not a Parliament. It is possible that Scotland
would have had a much more difficult time achieving any sort of devolution if it had
been the only region clamoring for more powers.
Also, many Scots felt that their views and interests were being overlooked

r
when it came to policies concerning the European Union. Due to the setup of the EU,
r
national governments have somewhat increased their powers as they are in a better
position to control EU policy. For example, originally, Scottish authorities would

(

I

i

have had to lobby the United Kingdom’s government so that it would push for
policies in its favor in the EU’s Council. Thus, the central UK government would
indirectly have control over policies concerning the environment or fisheries, areas
over which Scotland should have control. However, with devolution, Scotland holds a
place in the EU’s council of regions.

/.

When analyzing the path to Scottish devolution, I was surprised to find that it
had been so peaceful. This is probably because I had read and heard so much about
i

the violence in Northern Ireland. However, Scotland doesn’t have the religious
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differences that Northern Ireland has with England. It also does not have as recent a
history of violence, either. So far, Scottish devolution appears to have set the
example of how a separatist movement should evolve peacefully.

33

When Separatists Movements Turn Violent
The first difficulty in trying to analyze the violence in a separatist movement
is that most of the movements fall somewhere on a continuous spectrum between no
bloodshed at all and prolonged war. For example, if this spectrum were written out as
a number line with Peace on the left and Violence on the right, Scotland would fall to
the extreme left and Eritrea would fall on the extreme right. However, Quebec has
been peaceful, but there have been isolated instances of terrorism. The movements in
Northern Ireland and in the Basque regions of Spain have seen a great deal of
bloodshed, but no outright wars. Chiapas in southern Mexico falls somewhere closer
to the right with Biafra in Nigeria, but not as far to the right as Chechnya. Despite
this problem of having no set instance or definition for when a movement is “violent”
or “peaceful,” much can be learned from comparing different separatist movements’
relative positions.
Before a separatist movement is at the point where it can become violent or
peaceful, nationalist tendencies from a group of people must develop. Hechter
defines nationalism as “collective action designed to render the boundaries of the
„76

nation congruent with those of its governance unit.

However, there is still

difficulty in defining what actually constitutes a nation. Barash and Webel pithily
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describe nations as “ethnic groups writ large.’

In this context, nations are the ethnic

groups that have been more dominant in the past and thus have grown faster or for a
long period of time.
Barash and Webel go on to describe the beginnings of European nationalism
as when “peoples became increasingly aware of the existences of other peoples who
were similar to themselves, as well as others, generally farther away, who were quite
different.„78 This would have been around the time when the Treaty of Westphalia in
1648 ended in Thirty Years War in central Europe and was catalyzed by
improvements in communications and travel. Gunpowder also made castles
penetrable, which lessened the power of smaller local leaders.
Outside of Europe, colonialism disrupted this process of nation-building, and
many countries’ situations are currently much more volatile than nught have been
without outside interference of the colonialists. With colonialism and later
imperialism, boundaries were drawn which were not ethnically sensitive or were
different from what might have otherwise evolved. Thus, after many of the former
colonies gained independence some time after World War II, national and ethnic
79

divisions were a common source of wars and violence, In the case of Eritrea, the
peoples occupying that region of land have had no common ties outside of boundaries
drawn up by colonialist Italy and those arising from the oppression by the central
Ethiopian government. Thus, the Eritrean rebel fighters had a difficult time
developing mass support and even became split themselves. At one point, there
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existed two Eritrean rebel contingents and the Ethiopian military, all fighting each
other. Eritrea is more exceptional for its lack of nationalism in comparison to most
other separatist groups.
Often, a common culture already exists before the nationalism becomes more
salient. This is true in Scotland, which still has its own international sports teams.
and especially so in Quebec and Chechnya, whose culture is supported by a differing
language and religion from the central government. Within this common culture, a
part considers the protection of the national culture to be a private good, directly
affecting their welfare. This group might consist of teachers, priests, and entertainers,
80

who would all lose their livelihood if their culture was directly threatened.

One formation of nationalism in a modem setting involves elite action and is
supported by Delanty and O’Mahony. In this way,“the national question, initially
marginal, becomes dominant as a result of the ability of nationalist elites to forge a
81

coalition between the most important groups,

These are most likely the elites

whose livelihoods were threatened by the extinction of their culture. For whatever
reason the nationalism of a particular separatist group or region developed, what is
important for the central government is that the nationalism is not patriotism for the
central state. One important component of nationalism is that it is often combined
82

with antagonisms for other nations.

There must also be some advantages or incentives for the masses if they are
going to consider themselves a part of the nation, especially if it means that they are
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not a part of the central state. Barash and Webel talk about “the emotional appeal of
belonging, of shared deeds, and of extending the boundaries of one’s self to
.83

compromise a larger and seemingly more glorious whole.'

This might be a reason

for someone who wants to volunteer for a movement if he or she has nothing better to
do, but many others who join separatist movements feel forced to the periphery or
feel neglected by the central state.
When the group has decided that it is united in nationalism, that group often
feels the need for more autonomy or self-determination. Self-determination is often
cited as a situation where “people always prefer to act on the basis of their own
desires rather than those of others.„84 To some extent, the region has a great deal to
gain from being in a country of a large size as opposed to being independent. There
are the advantages of being in a possibly larger, more diverse economy along with
being in a better position for defense. However, if that region is already in a free85

trade zone, such as NAFTA or the EU,size is not important,

Thus, one of the

points of the Quebecois secessionists before the 1995 referendum was that Quebec
would still be a part of NAFTA even after it seceded. Furthermore, even though the
UK has a very small chance of being invaded, if Scotland were to secede, it could still
join a regional defense group such as NATO for its protection.
The policies of the central state can often exacerbate the nationalism and
separatist tendencies. One of the most quickly cited problems by peripheral
nationalist elites is that the central government’s policies aie hampering the economic
growth of the region. Some Scots believed that Scotland would profit more from its
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reserves in the North Sea if it were a sovereign state. However,Irish nationalists used
similar rhetoric before its independence, but “the Irish economy stagnated under
jj86

protectionist policies that held sway until the 1990s.

It is this point at which the group determines its options for obtaining more
autonomy. One way would be to organize pressure groups and then try to force a
referendum on independence or more autonomy from the central government.
However,if the government does not allow opposition parties or is particularly
autocratic, these peaceful options might not be possible. Thus,the group often resorts
to violence.
There are many different terms used to describe the intra-state warfare that
would ensue from a group violently attempting to gain further autonomy:
insurgencies, coups, revolutions, terrorism, small wars, limited wars,internal
conflicts, low-intensity conflicts, etc. However, there exists no obvious criteria for
87

distinguishing among those terms.

Furthermore,terms used to describe movements

or conflicts often reflect the political stance of the observer. For example, referring to
the conflict as a rebellion or insurgency often removes the political legitimacy of the
faction vying for more autonomy and buttresses the incumbent government, while
88

civil war implies that all sides have rational goals, which also might not be the case.
The first evidence of what might turn into a pro-longed violent conflict
usually comes from what the central government calls terrorists, for “the framework
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for much modem terrorist action is ethnic or nationalist.

89

This terrorist action could

range from the attention-getting, high-profile kidnapping of a governmental official

t

as happened in 1970 in Quebec, to armed contingents seizing government buildings
in a regional capital, as was the case with the EZLN in the southern state of Chiapas,
Mexico in 1994. What are terrorist activities also have much to do with the central
governments wishes. For example, Dzhokar Dudayev won a presidential pole in
Chechnya before declaring independence in 1991. This did not stop the Moscow
administration’s thickening up their rhetoric against him with terrorist accusations.
The scale of the terrorist attack corresponds more to the abilities and
organization of the extremist faction group carrying out the action as opposed to the
overall public support of the movement. Thus, a movement with relatively little
support might have an unproportionately large effect on the central state if its
extremists are organized and militant enough. In this same line of thought, the act of
p

terrorism itself might in part be an “attempt to preserve or ‘reawaken’ the national
*,

spirit.”^® This effort is partly accomplished by forcing the central government to
possibly take a sterner stance, further galvanizing all sides.
Often an influential leader plays a key role in initiating violence or continuing
it, once it has begun. One notorious example is Vellupillai Prabhakaran, who is head
of the LTTE in Sri Lanka. His extremist faction will stop nothing short of full
independence for the Tamil controlled northern parts of Sri Lanka and is infamous for
violent attacks against other, more moderate Tamil leaders interested in compromise.

89

Charles Townshen. Terrorism: A Very Short Introduction(New York; Oxford University Press,
2002), 74.
90
Townshend. Terrorism, 76.

39

Furthermore, those leaders often have personal interests in continued war after
91

violence has already begun, including the risk of wrath from the victorious power.
In terms of inciting the initial violence, a leader often partakes in what
»,92

Figueiredo and Weingast refer to as “gambling for resurrection.

In this scenario.

tt

leaders use violent conflict as a means of transforming politics from an issue on
„93

which they are likely to lost power into one on which they can retain power,

The

leader has such an interest in this scenario because it is the citizens and civilians who
actually bear the costs of the conflict, and not the leader himself.
After the initial instance of terrorism, the separatist movement can be
considered violent. This is especially the case if the main goal of the terrorist action
was to generate attention for a particular movement. Much of the public will come to
associate the movement with violence, especially if it is the public’s initial exposure
to the cause. Thus, after the first fatality occurs through an action of a part of the
movement, the state can be considered to be in civil war. Civil War” might seem
like an over-exaggeration for just one fatality; however, there is “no objective
measure of the magnitude of violence in civil wars as compared with other forms of
sub-state violence, for levels of conflict wax and wane in the course of any single
„94

dispute.

Therefore, under this definition of civil war, Canada was at war with the
Quebec separatist movement when the Quebec minister was murdered in 1970 by
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separatist extremists. However, Canada’s war is obviously not comparable to either
>

that of Chechnya’s or Eritrea’s. One reason could possibly be that Canada has a
lower tolerance for violence than other places. Thus, the extremists’ actions possibly
created more public disgust and outrage than actually generated support or strength
for the cause.
The central government is put in a very difficult position after the initial act of
violence. If it decides to take a firm stance against the movement and its aggressors,
it would possibly have to use force against its own citizens. This is especially
problematic as the violence progresses, and as the distinction between civilian and
combatant is blurred.^^ This situation creates further difficulty for a state that is not
as established or is still trying to develop legitimacy. This is especially true if the
government publicly denounces the movement or labels it “terrorist” or “criminal,”
because the government then “gives up any chance of gaining legitimacy with that
element.”^^ If the central government goes the opposite way of violence, it is often
viewed as being weak by third parties or by other regions wishing for more
autonomy.
The prevention of “Balkanization” is what central governments have more
recently been citing in order to support harsh policies against giving a region any
leeway at all. This refers to the area in the former Yugoslavia and its violent break
up after Croatia initially declared its independence. After Croatia, Albania, Bosnia,
Kosovo, and Montenegro followed suit, with innumerable atrocities of ethnic
cleansing occurring against the respective minorities of the newly formed countries.
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Thus, the central government might even incite a previously peaceful separatist
movement to resort to violence with its overly-stem denial of cooperation.
For when there have been previous violent confrontations between the state
and a separatist group, a myriad of problems continue in the ensuing “peace.” One
major difficulty in this situation is the nature of the paramilitary groups that often
constitute the violent factions of any separatist movement. Paramilitary groups are
very complex entities that often have no single, uncontested leader. This is why
»97

Darby believes that “cease fires are never unanimous,

In Chechnya, the Russian

military killed Dudayev in April of 1996 in a missile strike; however, the
organization, or lack thereof, of the Chechen paramilitaries has allowed fighting to
continue to this day. Most of the paramilitary now live in the mountains and operate
in small groups at night, striking with either rocket-propelled grenades or assault
rifles from automobiles. This type of violence could possibly continue indefinitely,
regardless of any cease-fire.
Years of violence often produce a stockpile of arms in regions that have
already experienced continued violence. In Angola, the price of an AK-47 is roughly
equivalent to the price of a chicken.^^ This not only makes the decommissioning of
paramilitary weapons difficult, but also leaves the society with a surplus of guns for
everyday criminal activity. Exchange programs are often offered after some sort of
peace arrangement has been made, but to many,“decommissioning smacks of
»99

surrender.
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When a state is attempting to prevent further violence in a region, it often
resorts to stationing more soldiers or other security forces in the region. Just the
presence of these soldiers is often reason enough for extremists to resort to action.
Thus, when the state is trying to reform the police and security forces in a region.
some group is still left that is dissatisfied.
One of the most notable differences between peaceftil and violent separatist
movements is that most violent movements occur in third-world, or developing.
countries. Most African countries, beyond the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict, have
experienced some sort of violent separatist movement. Besides Biafra, southern
Sudan has been in lengthy rebellion that rivals Eritrea’s, and the Ivory Coast, most
recently one of the most prosperous countries in West Africa, has been battling an
armed contingent in its northern regions since 2001. Do these nations resort to
violence more just because their economies are not as developed? Most likely not.
The first characteristic that might entice a separatist group to resort to violence
could be the weakness of the central state that accompanies many third-world
countries. If a region’s economy is not fully developed, there is not as much
commerce for the central government to tax to fund itself. For example, Ethiopia’s
government and military were much weaker at the beginning of Eritrea’s struggle
before receiving aid from the United States and later the Soviet Union. Furthermore,
the central government’s presence might be concentrated in the capital or only the
major cities, leaving the rest of the country more open to sedition. However, this
reasoning alone cannot explain the violence in Northern Ireland or the Basque regions
of Spain.
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Accompanying the weakness of the central state is the lack of education in
many developing countries. Again, if there is no commerce to tax, the government
has no money for public education. Even worse. religious groups may fill this role,
teaching students the glory of dying for causes or other extreme measures. However,
with a well-educated, literate society, groups wishing for more autonomy for their
region are more likely to use methods of democratic institutions than resort to
violence. A better educated population is also less susceptible to the rants of
demagogue seeking followers to aid a violent cause.
Another possible catalyst leading to armed conflict is a country’s having a
recent history of violence. To some extent, most countries’ boundaries have been
carved out in war, but some countries have a more recent history of violence. For
example, if the last major change that occurred for a government was a Henry
Kissinger backed military coup, a separatist movement interested in more autonomy
is much more likely to resort to violence as opposed to developing political parties

or

waiting around for referenda.
The history of the central government in dealing with regions that call for
more autonomy is also important. For example, Chechnya’s leaders might have
resorted to seizing Russian arms instead of attempting to use the new Russian
parliament, because the Russian state does not have a history of peaceful
compromise. Russia’s idea of compromise was made lucidly clear when Boris
Yeltsin had the parliament building shelled in 1993, killing over a hundred people.
On the other hand, fourteen other former regions of the Soviet Union declared their
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independence peacefully during its collapse. However, these regions were for the
most part not a part of Russia before the 1917 revolution.
Religion also plays a key role in many movements. In Chechnya, the
existence of Wahhabism or possibly another extremist Islamic sect, might be fueling
much of the fight against Russia. Some of the leaders might be attempting to
establish a fundamentalist Islam state in the region north of the Caucasus. Thus, they
have been able to convince some of the militants that the fight against Russia is part
of the largerjihad.
For a state that is already experiencing separatist violence, the prospects of
future peace are typically not very encouraging. The longer the violence continues,
the more extremists that are created who are willing to continue violent actions for a
cause. However, a glimmer of hope might be found in Darby’s describing violence as
a possible catalyst for peace. This idea stems from a “body of atrocities that...
100

sparked a public sense of outrage and became the catalyst for negotiations.
However, one wonders just how much more atrocious some of the conflicts could
possibly become.
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